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Abstract
In this paper, we explore the e¤ects of conspicuous goods as means of social division between
native citizens and migrants. We push forward the hypothesis that choosing a particular good
can confer a sense of place. We introduce this idea in an international vertical di¤erentiation
market with two variants and two social groups: migrants and natives. Natives are narrow-
minded since they attribute a positive social value to the variant that complies with their own
consumption culture. Migrants are open-minded. When consumers belonging to di¤erent groups
meet, they exchange information about their consumption habits and consumption well-being
that reveals their consumption culture: narrow-minded versus open-minded. Consequently, after
meeting, some consumers may change beliefs (narrow-minded to open-minded or vice versa) and
consumption choices. Using a dynamic model, we fully elucidate the steady state equilibrium
and highlight the impact of nationalism on migrant integration.
Keywords: relative preferences; vertical di¤erentiation; nationalistic consumption; dynamic
duopoly.
JEL Classication: D11; F18 ; L13.
1 Introduction
"Goods are neutral, their uses are social; they can be used as fences or bridges (Douglas and
Isherwood, 1979, 12)
As a consequence of globalization, 258 million people were living outside of their country of birth
in 2017. Nonetheless, nationalism is back. "A deepening fault line seems to divide cosmopolitans
and narrow-minded, advocates of drawbridge down and drawbridge up. It seems that more and
Corresponding Author: DISSE, University of Rome, La Sapienza Piazzale Aldo Moro, 5, Rome, 00100, Tel: +39
0649910253, Fax: +39 0649690326. Email: ornella.tarola@uniroma1.it
yCREA, University of Luxembourg. Address: Campus Kirchberg. 6, rue Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, L-1359
Luxembourg. Tel: (+352) 4666 44 6464; Fax (+352) 46 66 44 6341 email: skerdilajda.zanaj@uni.lu
1
more people are opting for the latter for closed over open. They do so, many commentators claim,
because they feel threatened by something called globalismand crave to have their particular na-
tional identities recognized and a¢ rmed." (Jan-Werner Müller, 2019). The results of the European
parliamentary election in 2019 testify to this trend. Fear of globalization can be expressed in several
various dimensions of human behavior. The one we are interested here refers to conspicuous goods
that become a means toward social division between native citizens and migrants.
Our analysis encompasses three main considerations.
The entry point is that the existence of signicant di¤erences in preferences across heterogeneous
societies conrms that the idea of selsh human beings does not su¢ ce to explain the economic be-
havior of consumers. In many cases, the "persons sense of self", their so-called identity, contributes
to guide an economic agents choices (Akerlof 1997, Akerlof and Kranton 2000).1 Embracing this
view leads to identifying the market not only as the place where goods are produced and exchanged
but also where this identity takes on a social content (Bowles, 1998).
In addition, it is well known that in a globalized economy with goods made available world-
wide, consumers are segmented by rms through the quality di¤erentiation of products. Firms
o¤ering exclusive brands are positioned in niches populated by consumers with a high willingness
to pay, while symmetrically, low-quality competitors meet the consumption demands of low-income
consumers located somewhere else in the market. Quite often, di¤erent variants of the same good
are viewed as a way to satisfy social needs: an exclusive brand confers on the buyer prestige and
esteem among peers, thereby distinguishing her/him from those who cannot a¤ord the same items.
Along the same rationale, a cheap variant can testify to a sense of belonging to a particular social
or cultural community. In some circumstances, the symbolic content of goods is even more relevant
than their intrinsic quality, and consumption is changed in a conspicuous practice.2 It is as if the
quality ladder in the market nds a corresponding social ladder among social groups. Goods are
used to conrm a sense of place.3 In this globalized era with increasingly signicant migration ows,
conspicuous consumption is becoming a massive phenomenon. Not only do natives tend to dene
their own social identity, culture, and moral values through conspicuous goods, but immigrants also
choose particular products for establishing themselves in a new country. Through consumption,
they can declare to native neighbors that they are willing to assimilate into the local culture and
1Harsanyi (1982) distinguishes between moral and personal preferences; Elster (1989) states that social norms are
the main drivers of economic agentsbehavior and are sustained by feeling of anxiety and guilt.
2Since Veblen (1899), this behavior has been well described by the theory of conspicuous consumption, in which
the utility (or status) of a consumer depends at least partially on the comparison between her own consumption
decision (and the quality of the product she buys) and that of others. In a related literature, the notion of social
status is considered as a driver of social behavior. See, for example, Bagwell and Bernheim (1996), Bowles and Park
(2005), Rege (2008), Kastanakis and Balabanis (2014), and Jinkins (2016).
3 In a companion approach developed in the eld of labor economics (Clark et al. 2010, Perez-Asenjo 2011), the
relative happiness of workers depends on their nancial status compared to that of others in their reference group.
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accept the social values of the host country. At the same time, they may also feel stigmatized by
fellow migrants who contrast the distinguishing cultural traits of their identity.
Finally, and in contrast with the second ingredient of our analysis, the resurgence of national-
ism pushes forward the idea of a national identity and somehow justies strict immigration laws,
import quotas, and tari¤s as a means to preserve the traditional values of a country. By preventing
integration, it can generate di¢ dence and the refusal of others among both natives and immigrants.
In a nationalist perspective, conspicuous goods can be a driver toward social division rather than
toward social integration. Adding this further dimension to the analysis opens the door to unex-
pected market congurations. For example, it cannot be excluded a priori that a narrow-minded
attitude experienced in a host country generates immigrant attachment to their own cultural her-
itage as a reaction. Alternatively, immigrants might be willing to assimilate into the local culture
in spite of the attitude of contempt among natives, possibly inducing the latter to question their
stance.
In order to formalize the above considerations, we dene a dynamic model with a country
composed of two groups of people with di¤erent cultural traits, natives and migrants, and where
two rms produce two vertically di¤erentiated goods. We assume that native consumers attribute
a social content to the goods. Specically, they derive additional satisfaction when consuming
a branded good that is in line with the dominant culture of their country and as a such can
satisfy their sense of place. In contrast, they su¤er a psychological penalty or frustration if they
consume the unbranded good, seen as a good representing a foreign culture and consumed by
the other group the migrants. We call this attitude narrow-mindedness. Migrants, when rst
entering the destination country, do not have any concern with respect to brand and only judge
the intrinsic quality of variants. We call this attitude open-mindedness. In our setting, social
division is measured by the attitudes, narrow- vs. open-minded, and consumption choices, branded
vs. unbranded goods, within the migrant population and the native population. Social division is
high whenever a very high number of natives remain narrow-minded in spite of encounters with
open-minded people or when a high number of migrants become narrow-minded. It turns out to be
extremely high when, due to the attitude toward narrow-mindedness, natives and migrants switch
to the variant that better complies with their own culture: the high-quality variant in the case of
natives and the low-quality variant in the case of migrants.
We describe a dynamic setting where consumers from the two groups meet and exchange expe-
riences about consumption. These interpersonal encounters may induce a change in beliefs about
consumption. Natives may cease to attribute a symbolic value to goods and become open-minded,
or migrants may start attaching social content to consumption, becoming narrow-minded. If a
change in beliefs takes place, then the individual consumption choice may change, with e¤ects on
the equilibrium conguration.
This dynamic process is represented through a multi-period game. We assume that in the rst
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period, the market solution is obtained before any meeting takes place. In the second period,
consumers meet. Meeting can either be segmented so that only consumers purchasing the same
variant meet, or it can be mixed such that consumers purchasing di¤erent variants meet. In this
period, changes in beliefs may occur. In the third period, consumers may change their consumption
choice so that a new market conguration appears. Finally, we show that from a certain period on,
no attitude changes occur, and therefore, the market solution has reached the steady state.
Our main results can be described as follows. When meetings are segmented, consumers buying
the low-quality variant are open-minded in both groups at the steady state market solution, whereas
consumers buying the high-quality variant are narrow-minded. In contrast, when meetings are
mixed, open-minded natives and narrow-minded migrants buy the low-quality variant at the steady
state market solution, whereas narrow-minded natives and open-minded migrants buy the high-
quality variant. When meetings are segmented, nationalism a¤ects the evolution of consumption
culture in the migrant group. More specically, nationalism denes the number of migrants that
quit being open-minded, mimic the native population, and start being narrow-minded. In contrast,
when meetings are mixed, nationalism a¤ects the natives consumption culture. In particular,
nationalism increases the number of natives who continue to be narrow-minded.
2 Related literature
Our analysis develops along several research lines. The key concept of consumers having a social
identity stems from Tajfel and Turners (1979) pioneering contribution to psychology. They formu-
late a three-step process for a social identity to be dened: people are rst placed into categories,
then they associate themselves with particular groups, and nally, these groups are contrasted with
other groups, thereby generating a sense of place. This perspective is at rst sight far from the
mainstream view in economics postulating the existence of a rational and selsh agent with given
preferences. Still, it has brought forth a lot of interest among economists in the role (if any) of social
interaction in shaping collective values, preferences, and economic behavior. In the 1990s, Akerlof
introduced the notion of social decision in economic theory and advanced the idea that "each person
chooses her respective position in a social space". Later, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) introduced
the identity, a persons sense of self, in the utility function and showed how the standard economic
congurations change when the traditional selsh agent is replaced by a social economic agent. In
a companion stream of literature on endogenous preferences, Bowles (1998) analyzes the e¤ects
of institution on preferences, which are considered to be endogenously determined, and discusses
the mechanisms through which people dene their own preferences over time. Later, Benabou and
Tirole (2003 and 2006) emphasized the role of beliefs and cognitive processes that lead to pro-social
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behaviors.4
Although our paper shares this interest, the two other ingredients in the analysis globalization
and nationalism shift the focus to the e¤ect of social identity on economic choices under cross-
cultural inuences, thereby linking our analysis to recent contributions on cultural integration.
Central to these (Kuran and Sandholm 2008, Mason 1993) is the statement that under cross-cultural
exchange and migration movements, people may change their feelings with respect to consumption:
ethnocentric positions can be exacerbated, thereby fueling anti-globalization movements; economic
behavior can be directed by the willingness to protect the in-group social identity, or rather, to
accommodate the cultural traits of the outgroup.5 Although close in spirit to these contributions,
our modelling strategy places our analysis far away from them. More precisely, we combine the view
that goods are used by consumers to contrast their own habits with those of migrant neighbors with
the notion of relative preferences adopted by Ben Elhadj et al. (2015).6 In their setting of vertical
di¤erentiation à la Mussa and Rosen (1978), consumers value a good along a relative dimension:
its relative quality, namely the quality gap with respect to another adjacent variant, determines its
ranking along a social ladder and thus its economic price. We add to this formalization a further
component that captures consumersethnocentric feelings, and we assume that this component is
group-specic, meaning it changes depending on whether natives or migrants are considered.
3 The model
Consider a country composed of two groups of individuals with di¤erent consumption culture traits,
natives N and migrants M , and where two rms (or sectors) produce two vertically di¤erentiated
goods. The two rms and the two goods are labelled, by slightly abusing the notation, h and l. The
h (resp. l) rm produces the high-quality variant uh (resp. low ul). In each group, heterogeneous
4Several contributions disentangle the roles of social norms and moral motivations as a drivers of worthwhile
behavior (Elster 1989). On this, see Brekke et al. (2003) and Janssen and Mendys-Kamphorst (2004). Some
interesting insights have been provided in the literature on impure altruism introduced by Andreoni (1990).
5The idea that consumers may be reluctant to buy foreign products is not recent. It was introduced by Shimp
and Sharma (1987) through the notion of ethnocentrism. In their seminal paper, the authors emphasize the role
of in-group a¢ liation and belief in the morality of domestic consumption. "Ethnocentrism represents the universal
proclivity for people to view their own group as the center of the universe, to interpret other social units from the
perspective of their own group, and to reject persons who are culturally dissimilar while blindly accepting those who
are culturally like themselves (Booth 1979; Worchel and Cooper 1979)." The symbols and values of ones own ethnic
or national group become objects of pride and attachment, whereas symbols of other groups may become objects of
contempt (Levine and Campbell 1972). Empirical analyses on the cultural integration of migrants have recently been
developed inter alia by Constant et al. (2006), Zimmermann et al. (2007), and Nekby and Rödin (2007).
6There are several papers dealing with specic relative preferences, such as Akerlof (1997), where the satisfaction
of a consumer increases with the gap between their personal status and that of others. See also Alexopoulos and
Sapp (2006) and Riechmann (2006) for an analysis of these relative preferences from the viewpoint of rms. These
preferences are also labeled other-regarding preferences.
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consumers are indexed by  and uniformly distributed over the interval [a; b] , with a  1:7 The
parameter  captures the consumersheterogeneous willingness to pay for the good: the higher is
, the higher the utility obtained when consuming the good, whatever the group. Each consumer
buys one unit of a given commodity.
In only one group, say N , consumers may present feelings of attachment for good h. We
can imagine that good h is a well-known and well-reputed good that natives are accustomed to
consuming; for instance, a well-known brand versus an unbranded medicinal product. In fact, many
examples can be considered that constitute a certain lifestyle. We assume that this style is in line
with the dominant culture of the natives and contrasts with the cultural, social, and racial traits of
the other group, the migrants. We refer to the attitude of putting a social value on consumption as
narrow-mindedness. By contrast, we refer to a consumer who derives satisfaction from the quality
of the good and does not attribute any social meaning to consumption as open-minded.
Formally, native consumers derive additional satisfaction when consuming variant h rather
than l. In contrast, they su¤er a psychological penalty if they consume the unbranded good l.8 To
formalize these ideas, we use a vertical di¤erentiation model à la Mussa and Rosen with relative
preferences nested within a social segmentation component. Thus, the utility function of an native
consumer is given by
UN () =
(
uh   ph + (buh   ul) if she buys h
ul   pl   (puh   ul) if she buys l
(1)
where  > b > p > 1 >   0: The native consumer who consumes good h has an additional
utility benet given by (buh   ul) whereas when she buys l, she su¤ers frustration measured by
(puh   ul): Parameter i; i = h; l magnies the social component independently whether it is a
benet or a frustration. Parameter  captures the intensity of social feelings in consumption. We
assume that the social benet component (buh   ul) is di¤erent from the psychological penalty
when consuming the unbranded good.9 This formulation adds to the traditional utility function
a social component (iuh   ul); i = h; l nested within a social segmentation component iuh;
i = h; l.
To guarantee that the utility level of a native consumer buying good l is a priori positive (i.e.
ul   (puh   ul) > 0), it must hold that
+ 

ul
uh
> p:
In addition, we assume that 2ul   uh > 0; namely the quality gap is not extremely signicant.10
7This assumption is necessary to keep the utility function in line with the vertical di¤erentiation model.
8Note that this assumption is not essential. The additional satisfaction may not necessarily be aligned with the
quality of the good.
9We can nevertheless easily recover the case when b = p.
10For the implications of this assumption, see the third period under the segmentation scenario.
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Finally, migrants do not perceive any social segmentation when choosing what to consume.
Thus, the utility function of a migrant is
UM () =
(
uh   ph if she buys h
ul   pl if she buys l
:
In the following, we describe a dynamic setting where consumers from the two groups meet and
exchange experiences about consumption. We assume that in each period, every consumer from
group N meets at least one consumer from group M .11 These encounters may induce a change of
preference in goods. A necessary condition for this change in preference to arise is that citizens
belonging to di¤erent groups meet. A su¢ cient condition for the change is a utility benet. For
instance, if a migrant meets a native consumer whose level of utility is higher, then the migrant
decides to change his beliefs incorporated in his utility function and starts putting a social value
on consumption, as the natives do. In a way, meeting someone who is better o¤ induces mimicking
that may bring a higher utility level. This implies that encounters may cause an expansion or a
reduction of narrow-mindedness, and similarly for open-mindedness. Ultimately, as a consequence
of these changes in belief, the actual individual consumption choice may change, leading to changes
in the market.
For the model to be tractable, we make two important assumptions. First, we separate the
periods of meeting from the periods of market decision. More specically, our modelling framework
is as follows. In the rst period, the market solution is obtained before any meeting takes place.
In the second period, consumers meet and exchange experiences. In this second period, changes
in belief may occur. Natives may change their beliefs about the branded good, or migrants may
start attaching a social value to consumption. As we will clarify in Section V, as a consequence
of meeting, in some future periods two di¤erent beliefs may appear within the same group. For
instance, some natives may keep their consumption culture while others change their beliefs and
stop putting a social value on consumption, becoming open-minded. Whenever this occurs, the
behavior that is mimicked by the other group, namely migrants, is again the behavior giving the
highest payo¤.
Second, for the sake of generality, we allow both meetings between consumers buying the same
variants (segmented meetings) and meetings between consumers choosing di¤erent variants (mixed
meetings). In each case, the same meeting rule applies for every future period. If at t = 2 consumers
buying the same variant meet, in every future meeting period, only consumers buying the same
variant meet.12
11We do not need to impose much structure on the number of individuals who meet.
12We could study abrupt changes of this rule. For instance, we could assume that for n periods, citizens consuming
the same good meet, and then at some future period, consumers buying di¤erent goods meet. This change would not
qualitatively change our results in the steady state analysis.
7
It is worth noting that the amount of consumers buying a particular variant changes in every
period before the steady state is reached (if it exists) because prices change.
Finally, we show that from a certain period on, neither beliefs nor prices change anymore. We
call this market equilibrium a steady state. More specically, a steady state is reached when (i) no
changes in attitudes occur, despite the fact that meetings continue to take place in each period; and
(ii) consequently, optimal prices remain invariant for any future period.
4 Entry period analysis: the benchmark
At the rst period entry of migrants takes place. Inter-group meetings have not taken place so that
consumers may only exchange intra-group. By assumption, intra-group meetings bring no changes
in beliefs since each group shares a homogenous consumption culture. The market structure at this
period is the benchmark.
In line with the traditional model of vertical product di¤erentiation, the marginal consumer in
each group N (ph; pl) and M (ph; pl) ; respectively write as
N (ph; pl) =
ph   pl   
 
uh
 
b + p
  2ul
uh   ul
M (ph; pl) =
ph   pl
uh   ul
If  = 0; we recover the traditional expression of the marginal consumer in the vertical di¤ereni-
tation model. In this framework, the demand functions faced by rms h and l write, respectively,
as:
xh = (b  N (ph; pl)) + (b  M (ph; pl))
xl = (N (ph; pl)  a) + (M (ph; pl)  a):
Maximizing the prot function of rm i; i = xipi; with i = h; l we get the optimal price at the
rst period pi :
ph =
2b  a
3
(uh   ul) +
  
b + p

uh   2ul


6
pl =
b  2a
3
(uh   ul) 
  
b + p

uh   2ul


6
and the price di¤erence as
ph   pl =
(a+ b)
3
(uh   ul) 
 
2ul  
 
b + p

uh


3
(2)
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It can be noticed that the higher the social component of preferences, both for the social benet
b as well as the frustration p, the higher the price gap. The economic intuition underlying this
features can be captured as follows. This social component enables consumers to appreciate the
social benet coming from the branded variant behind the material needs which are traditionally
met, while condeming consumers purchasing the unbranded one to a frustration. The former benet
pushes upward the price of the branded variant ph, which thus is xed at higher level than in a
setting without social preferences, while the frustration moves downward the price of the unbranded
variant pl . The e¤ect of b and p on the price of the low quality variant passes also through the
strategic interaction between rms. Because prices are strategic complements, the price of the low
variant increases as ph increases. It follows that p

l also raises with b and p: Nonetheless, the
social downward pressure is more signicant than the strategic upward one.
At the rst period, the prot functions for each rm evaluated at optimal prices are:
h =
1
18
 
2 (uh   ul) (a  2b) + 
 
2ul  
 
b + p

uh
2
uh   ul
l =
1
18
 
2 (uh   ul) (2a  b)  
 
2ul  
 
b + p

uh
2
uh   ul
Notice that as far as h (resp. 

l ); both price and demand at equilibrium raise (resp. decrease)
with the social components b and p: This explains why 

h (resp. 

l ) raises (resp. decrease) with
i; i = b; p:
The expressions of the marginal consumers in each group at the optimal prices obtain as
N =
1
3
(a+ b)  2
 
uh
 
b + p
  2ul
3 (uh   ul)
M =
1
3
(a+ b) +

 
uh
 
b + p
  2ul
3 (uh   ul)
with @

N
@b
< 0 and @

N
@p
< 0 whereas @

M
@p
> 0 and @

M
@b
> 0: Finally, N   M = 
2ul uh(b+p)
uh ul < 0:
As expected, a higher number of natives consume the high quality good as compared to migrant
consumers.
At the next period 2, consumers only meet. The meetings can happen among people consuming
the same good or di¤erent ones. If we assume that citizens consuming the same good meet at
period 2, then in every future period of meetings t, only consumers buying the same good in t  1;
will meet. Similarly, if we assume that citizens consuming di¤erent good meet at period 2, then in
every future period of meetings t, only consumers buying di¤erent good in t  1; will meet.
In particular, we observe the following meetings: migrants and natives that meet consume the
same good, either h or l; or migrants and natives that meet consume di¤erent goods, either h and
l; or l and h:We start analysing the attitude change when consumers that meet are consuming the
same good. For this scenario, we develop fully the analysis of transition to the steady state. Then,
we turn the attention to the scenario where consumers buying di¤erent goods meet.
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5 Segmentation scenario
In this scenario, only consumers consuming the same good meet. This means that natives and
migrants consuming the low variant meet and the natives and migrants consuming the high quality
good meet. Meetings are segmented according to the consumption habits.
5.1 Second period: attitude change
To describe the possible changes in preferences, we start by analyzing the scenario where natives
buying good l meet with migrants consuming good l and natives buying good h meet with migrants
buying good h: We check rst the possible change in the meeting of consumers buying l and then
consumers buying h: These two parts are complements and they are both necessary to characterize
changes occuring in the whole population of both groups that we investigate in the following
subsection.
5.1.1 Migrants and natives consuming l
A native consuming variant l with an utility UNl () = ul   pl   (puh   ul) meets a native
consuming l with UFl () = ul   pl: Although they buy the same good, their level of utilities are
di¤erent because the second is open-minded and does not give a social component to consumption.
The utility di¤erential is given by
UMl ()  UNl

~

= ul   ~ul + (puh   ul) for any  2 [a; M ] and ~ 2 [a; N ]
and
UMl ()  UNl

~

> 0 since N < 

M
Thus, for any given level of willigness to pay, native consumers may increase their utility level only
by ceasing to be narrow-minded. By abandoning the social feature of consumption, their utility
function turns out to be UHl () = ul pl; while migrants do not change their consumption culture.
5.1.2 Migrants and natives consume h
A native consuming variant h with an utility UNh () = uh   ph + (buh   ul) meets a migrant
consuming h with UMh () = uh   ph: In this case
UNh

^

  UMh () = ^uh   uh + (buh   ul) > 0 for any  2 [M ; b] and ^ 2 [N ; b]
Thus, migrants mimic natives and become narrow-minded.
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Lemma 1 If natives and migrants consuming the same variant meet, then in both groups, in period
two, open-mindess spreads among consumers buying variant l whereas narrow-mindness prevails
among consumers buying variant h:
5.2 Third period: consumption changes
At this period, rms h and l dene their equilibrium prices taking into account the demand functions
that encompass the attitude update generated by encounters at the second period. Consumers, in
turn, modify the consumption choices in line with these prices and their attitude, as dened at
period two.
In order to characterize the equilibrium conguration, we rst dene the marginal consumers
thereby building the corresponding prot functions.
Following the result in Lemma 1, in this scenario, in period 3, the marginal consumer can be
found by the equality ul   pl = uh   ph + (buh   ul) in the native group. By constrast, in
the migrant group, the narrow-minded migrant feels now frustration by consuming h because she
perceives stigma from his own group of migrants. His utility is now UMh = uh  ph (pul uh):
Therefore, the marginal consumer in the migrant group is given by ul pl = uh ph (pul uh)
: Therefore, we have
N (ph; pl) =
ph   pl +  (ul   buh)
uh   ul
M (ph; pl) =
ph   pl   
 
uh   pul

uh   ul
It follows that for rm l and h; demand function write, respectively, as
xL(ph; pl) = (N (ph; pl)  a) + (N (ph; pl)  a)
xH(ph; pl) = (b  M (ph; pl)) + (b  M (ph; pl))
Maximizing prot function i = pixi wrt pi; we get the optimal price pi at the third period:
ph =
1
3
(uh   ul) (2b  a) + 1
6

 
uh   ul + buh   pul

pl =
1
3
(uh   ul) (b  2a)  1
6

 
uh   ul + buh   pul

:
Notice that under this type of encounters the optimal price of the high quality variant decreases
with time (i.e. ph   ph < 0), whereas by contrast the optimal price of the low quality variant
increases with time (i.e. pl   pl > 0).
At these optimal prices, the indi¤erent consumer j in each group j = N;M at the third period
is found as:
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N =
(uh   ul) (a+ b) + 
 
uh   2buh + 2ul   pul

3 (uh   ul)
M =
(uh   ul) (a+ b) + (b   2)uh +
 
2p   

ul
3 (uh   ul) ;
Let us dene the threshold p =
2uh ul
2ul uh that equilizes 

M = 

M : Then,
Lemma 2 In the third period, the market share for the high quality good among natives decreases,
i.e. N   N > 0; whereas the market share for the high quality good among migrants decreases
(resp. increases) i.e. M   M T 0 i¤ p T p:
Proof. The di¤erence N   N is equal to 13
(2p+1)uh (p+2)ul
uh ul :The numerator of this expression
is positive i¤ uhul >
p+2
2p+1
: We can easily prove that
p+2
2p+1
< 1: It follows that uhul >
p+2
2p+1
is always
satisied being uhul > 1; implying that 

N   N > 0:
The di¤erence M  M is equal to 13
(2ul uh)p+ul 2uh
uh ul : Under the assumption 2ul uh > 0; we
have M  M T 0 if p T p. The threshold p is not redundant because p > 1, 3 (uh   ul) > 0:
Hence, with respect to the benchmark, encounters of natives and migrants consuming the same
good reduces the consumption of the high quality variant among natives, while the e¤ect of en-
counters on migrants consumption habits depends on the size of the frustration parameter p: The
share of migrants consuming the high quality decreases only if the parameter p measuring social
stigma is relatively high.
The largest group consuming h remains the native group because M  N = buh uh+pul uluh ul >
0:
5.3 Steady state analysis
We turn now the attention to the steady state analysis. We show in the following that when
consumers buying the same good meet, at the steady state the low willigness buyers in both groups
become open-minded, whereas high willigness consumers in both groups are narrow-minded. This
is true for high or low level of p: Nonetheless, the magnitude of p crucially denes how much the
attitude of narrow-mindness is spread among migrants and ultimately it nails down to what extent
social division persists in the steady state.
To ease the understanding, at the third period and the consequent ones, we present in Fig 1
the evolution of consumption culture (narrow vs open mindness) until the steady state is reached.
Each line represents the heterogenous population of each group. Consumers (Narrow-minded Nl or
Open-minded Ol) buying the low quality good are represented in blue and those (Narrow-minded
Nh or Open-minded Oh) consuming the high quality good in orange. In each period, the graph
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Figure 1: Dynamics of attitutes and preferences when p  p
displays the marginal consumer in each group: N and 

M for the rst period and the second one
where only meetings take place; N and 

M for the third period on.
Assume rst that p is high, p  p. Then, in period 3, we have among natives (a; N )
consumers buying l as open-minded; (N ; 

M ) consumers choose l as narrow-minded; while (

N ; b)
consumers choose h as narrow-minded. Rather, among migrants (a; M ) consumers choose l as open-
minded; (N ; 

M ) consumers choose l being narrow-minded; nally (

M ; b) consumers choose h
as narrow-minded. Given this market segmentation at period 3, at period 4 meetings takes place.
This means that open-minded natives consuming l and narrow-minded natives su¤ering a stigma,
meet with migrants that can have both attitudes who consume l (see Fig1 for period 3): Following
the rule that the preferences that di¤use are those giving the higher level of utility, then, the
change in beliefs leads to the market structure shown in Fig 1 in period 4. Namely, open-minded
natives consume l and narrow-minded natives consume h: In the migrant group the division is the
same: open-minded migrants consume l and close-minded migrants consume h: This is exactly
the market structure of period 2, hence in period 5 prices are those of period 3 that will dene a
market structure that is exaclty the same as the market structure of period 2. From now on, no
changes occur anylonger in terms of perferences. The market is stable with l consumers that are
open-minded and h consumers that put social value to consumption in each group.
Assume now that p is low, p < p, implying that 

M < 

M (see Fig 2) In this range of
values of p; the attitude structure in the migrant group is as follows. In the third period, migrants
consuming l are all open-minded, whereas those consuming good h are open-minded in the interval
(M ; 

M ) and narrow-minded otherwise. Nonetheless, in period 4 onwards, meetings make all
migrants consuming l open-minded. It follows that the steady state is reached as in the case where
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Figure 2: Dynamics of attitutes and preferences when p < p:
p is low. The di¤erence between these two steady state conditions is that the steady state marginal
consumer M is smaller when p is smaller. We can state the following result.
Proposition 3 Assume segmented meetings. In the steady state market solution, consumers buying
the low quality variant are open-minded in both groups, whereas consumers buying the high quality
variant are narrow-minded. The lower the intensity of social stigma among natives, the higher the
number migrants switching from open-mindness to narrow-mindness.
Our model suggests that the lower the the social content of goods among natives (low p),
the higher the degree of social division among the two groups due to the switch of migrants from
open to narrow-mindness. Recall that a measure of social division is the spread of narrow-mindness.
Proposition 1 shows that the lower p, and the higher number of narrow-minded migrants consuming
h: This surprising result of migrants choosing variant h; in spite of their narrow-mindness is due to
the twofold role played by p : it captures not only the frustration of natives when consuming the
low quality variant l; but also that of migrants when consuming the high-quality variant h: The role
of p among migrants explains why a low value of p tends to push upward the equilibrium price
of variant h; while moving downward the equilibrium price of variant l: migrants do not su¤er too
much when buying h; so that rm H can keep high ph without losing consumers in the market.
Along the same rationale, variant l has not an extremely strong social content for natives which are
able to evaluate the intrinsic quality of this variant. It is as if a low value of p would magnify the
traditional drivers emerging in vertical prduct di¤erentiation, while weaking the social component
of preferences.
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6 Mixed scenario
We now analyse a di¤erent type of meeting. In this section, we assume natives consuming good
l mix with migrants consuming h; and vice versa. We check for the possible changes in each type
of meeting and then construct the changes in the total population of each group.
6.1 Second period: attitude change
As above, we check rst the possible change in the meeting of natives consumers buying l and
migrants buying h; and then natives consumers buying h and migrants buying l: These two parts are
complements and they are both necessary to characterize changes occuring in the whole population
of both groups that we investigate in the following.
6.1.1 Migrants consume h and natives consume l
In this case, the utility di¤erential is
UMh

^

  UNl () = ^uh   ph  
 
ul   pl   (puh   ul)

for ^ 2 [M ; b] and  2 [a; N ]:
To investigate the sign of the above di¤erence, we substite for the expression of prices and we
evaluate the di¤erence for ^ = N and  = M : If the di¤erence is positive for these values of ;
then, the di¤erence is always positive for any feasible value of  and ^. The di¤erence boils down
to the following expression
UMh

^

  UNl () = 
pu
2
h   u2l + (b   1)uhul
uh   ul > 0
It follows that UMh

^

  UNl () > 0:
6.1.2 Migrants consume l and natives consume h
In this case, the utility di¤erential is given by
UHh

^

  UFl () = ^uh   ph + (buh   ul)  (ul   pl)
with ^ 2 [N ; b] and  2 [a; M ]: Solving the inequality for p; we get as solution p = 1u2h
 
u2l + uhul   buhul

<
1: Since by assumption, p > 1 > p; it holds that U
H
h

^

 UFl () > 0. So, migrants change their
beliefs and start being narrow-minded.
We have now all the necessary to claim the attitute changes in period 2 among natives and
migrants.
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Lemma 4 Under segmented meetings, narrow-minded preferences disappear among consumers
buying variant l; while narrow-mindness prevails among consumers buying variant h:
Under mixed meetings, natives consuming l become open-minded similarly to migrants consum-
ing h; whereas migrants consuming l become narrow-minded, as natives consuming h:
6.2 Third period: attitude change
At period 2 people consuming di¤erent variants have met. As a result, we know that at period 2
in market N; consumers buying h are narrow-minded while consumers buying l are open-minded.
In market M; consumers buiyng l; put social value to consumption, while consumers buying h; do
not. Recall that the migrant who switches behavior and starts putting social value to consumtion
feels a social benet when consuming l and a social stigma if consuming good h:
Thus, the marginal consumer in market N and M; solves the following indi¤erence conditions,
respectively:
ul   pl = uh   ph + (buh   ul)
ul   pl + (pul   uh) = uh   ph
so that
N (ph; pl) =
ph   pl +  (ul   buh)
uh   ul
M (ph; pl) =
ph   pl   uh + bul
uh   ul :
Using the demand functions for rm L and H; from prot maximization, the optimal prices at
period 3 are immediately found
ph =
1
3
(uh   ul) (2b  a) + 1
6
 (uh   ul) (b + 1)
pl =
1
3
(uh   ul) (b  2a)  1
6
 (uh   ul) (b + 1)
So that
N =
(uh   ul) (a+ b)  (2b   1)uh + (2  b)ul
3 (uh   ul)
M =
(uh   ul) (a+ b) + (b   2)uh + (2b   )ul
3 (uh   ul)
Let us dene the threshold ~p =
ul(4+b 2) uh(1 2b(1 ))
2uh
that equilizes N = 

N ; then
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Lemma 5 The market share among natives consuming the high quality good in period 3, decreases
(resp. increases), i.e. N   N T 0 i¤ p T ~p: By contrast, the market share of the high quality
good among migrants certainly increases in period 3, i.e. M   M < 0.
Proof. The di¤erence N   N is equal to 13
2uhp+(uh(2b 2b+1) ul(4+b 2))
uh ul : The sign of this
expression is positive i¤ p > ~p : ~p is higher than one, i¤ b >
 (2ul(2 1) uh 2uh)
(ul+2uh(1 )) ; which in turn
is higher than one i¤  > 1=4: Hence; if  > 1=4 and b >
 (2ul(2 1) uh 2uh)
(ul+2uh(1 )) ; then 

N   N T 0
i¤ p T ~p: If  < 1=4; then  (2ul(2 1) uh 2uh)(ul+2uh(1 )) < 1; hence for any b; 

N T N if p T 0:
The di¤erence M  M is equal to 13
 2uh puh+ul+2bul
uh ul : The numerator is negative if
(2b+1)
(p+2)
<
uh
ul
: This last inequality is always true because b >
p
2 is always true by assumption, implying that
M   M < 0.
Finally, M   N > 0; showing that in period 3, the number of natives consuming the high
quality remains larger than the corresponding number of migrants.
6.3 Steady state analysis
As we stated in Lemma 4, in this case, in the second period of meetings, the natives consuming l
switch to being open-minded mimicing migrants consuming h; while migrants consuming l switch
to being narrow-minded mimicing natives consuming h:
Assume rst that p is high, p  ~p. Optimal prices obtained in period 3, dene two di¤erent
consumption cultures among natives consuming l:The rst group on the right of N is open-minded,
whereas on the right of N , consuming either l or h they remain narrow-minded. In the migrant
group consuming l, we have only narrow-minded. Whereas, we have two consumption cultures on
the right of M ; as shown in Fig 3. In period 4, meetings occur again. Following the rule that
the preferences that prevail are those giving the highest payo¤, we conclude that natives buying
l and migrants buying h are open-minded. Whereas, natives buying h and migrants buying l are
narrow-minded.
Assume now that p is low, p < ~p. It follows that 

N is now smaller than 

N (see Figure 4).
Therefore in period 3, there are two types of culture among natives on the left of N : No changes
appear among migrants in this case as compared with the scenario where p is high. Meetings in
period 4, again dene a similar structure as above: natives buying l and migrants buying h are
open-minded; whereas, natives buying h and migrants buying l are narrow-mindeds. Nonetheless,
there is an important di¤erence, because the numerosity of narrow-minded natives is much higher
when p is low then when p is high. We can state the following result.
Proposition 6 Assume mixed meetings. In the steady state market solution, open-minded natives
and narrow-minded migrants buy the low variant good, whereas narrow-minded natives and open-
minded migrants buy the high quality variant. The lower the intensity of social stigma among
natives, the higher the number of natives buying as narrow-minded.
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Figure 3: Dynamics of attitutes and preferences when p  ~p:
7 Discussion
It is interesting to highlight the di¤erent role of frustration p embodied in the narrow-minded
preferences.
When meetings are segregated along the consumption good, then the size of p a¤ects cultural
evolution in the migrant group. More specically, the size of p denes the number of migrants
who quit being open-minded, mimic the native population, and start being narrow-minded.
By contrast, when meetings are mixed according to consumption habits, then the size of p
a¤ects the nativesconsumption culture. More specically, the intensity of frustration a¤ects the
number of natives who continue being narrow-minded and buy the high-quality variant, which
better satises their sense of place.
In the rst case, the lower p is, the higher is the number of migrants who become narrow-
minded. In the second scenario, the lower p is, the larger is the number of natives who remain
narrow-minded.
Interestingly, this result shows that when populations with conicting social-cultural traits
meet, the prevailing cultural attitude cannot be determined a priori. The di¤usion of nationalism
depends, on the one hand, on the intensity of the frustration of narrow-minded consumers when
purchasing goods that do not belong to the set of national cultural values. On the other hand, it
is also determined by the characteristics of the country where meetings take place. If under mild
nationalism meetings take place in a country that is segregated in consumption, then migrants
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Figure 4: Dynamics of attitutes and preferences when p < ~p:
mimic mild nationalism and start being narrow-minded like the natives of the destination country.
In this case, each population tends to protect its own culture, and perhaps even more relevant, to
su¤er when purchasing goods that are somehow close to the other culture.
By contrast, if mild nationalism exists in a country not segregated in consumption, then the
arrival of migrants will leave the cultural attitude of natives relatively invariant, while at the same
time keeping many migrants open-minded.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we used a dynamic model to characterize the steady state market solution of two
scenarios with di¤erent types of meetings. Starting from the idea that when goods are used to
conrm a sense of place attitude and consumption habits may become a measure of social division,
we have described the evolution of a market at rst populated by narrow-minded natives and open-
minded migrants. Based on the steady state conguration under segmented or mixed encounters,
we can draw two nal conclusions. Firstly, it is mild nationalism (low level of p) and not strong
nationalism that expands either among natives and/or migrants. Strong nationalism is too costly
and thus is abandoned more often by initially narrow-minded buyers. Secondly, the expansion of
mild nationalism contaminates migrants only when consumption habits are segmented.
Although our model is highly stylized, it provides some insight into relatively topical issues. For
example, it identies possible patterns of cultural integration depending on the host countries and
the types of encounters that are possible.
As a natural by-product of these theoretical ndings, casual observations conrm that in coun-
tries with a strong social identity where meetings typically take place between groups sharing the
same income or living in the same area, e.g., France and Hungary, migrants tend to preserve the
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cultural traits of their origin countries and, in some circumstances, to aunt their social, consump-
tion, and religious habits. These attitudes toward origin cultures are rather mitigated in the USA,
however, where the ethnical mix is so strong that meetings do not develop along a unique dimen-
sion. These considerations open the door to an empirical research path that could inform future
analyses.
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